In many situations, an uninformed agent (UA) needs to elicit information from an informed agent (IA) who has unique expertise or knowledge related to some opportunity available to the UA. In many of those situations, the correctness of the information cannot be verified by the UA, and therefore it is important to guarantee that the information-elicitation mechanism incentivizes the IA to report truthfully. This paper presents and studies several informationelicitation mechanisms that guarantee truthful reporting, differing in the type of costs the IA incurs in producing and delivering the information. With no such costs, the expense for the UA in eliciting truthful information is positive but arbitrarily small. When information-delivery is costly, the extra expense for the UA (above the unavoidable cost of delivery) is arbitrarily small. Finally, when the information-production is costly, as long as the cost is sufficiently small, truthful information elicitation is possible and the extra expense for the UA (above the unavoidable cost of production) is arbitrarily small.
Introduction
In many real-life situations we need to know the value of some objects or opportunities available to us, but do not have the expertise to calculate it ourselves. Here are some examples.
1. You find a dazzling jewelery collection in a locked suitcase hidden in your attic and want to sell it. Knowing the exact value of each jewel can be very helpful for you when negotiating with potential buyers.
2. You are a government owning some oil fields. You need to estimate the potential revenue from each field in order to know which of them is worth developing.
3. You sell a used car. You need to know its value in order to decide how much to ask for it.
A common solution in these situations is to buy the desired information from an expert ; Moldovanu and Tietzel [1998] ; ; Alkoby et al. [2015] ; Sarne et al. [2014] , such as a jewel appraiser in 1, a geologist in 2 or a car mechanic in 3. Henceforth we call such an expert the IA (Informed Agent). The problem is that, in many cases, the information is not verifiable at the time it is delivered. When you pay the IA, you have no way of knowing whether the provided information is correct. Perhaps you will realize the true value later on (e.g, when you actually dig for oil), but at that later time, the IA might already be far away with your money in her pockets or the loss due to using the wrong value is already irreversible.
The problem of eliciting the true value becomes even more challenging when calculating and delivering the true value is costly for the IA, e.g., it requires the IA to invest time and effort. Here, the IA has a strong incentive to avoid calculating the true value and report an arbitrary value, since the Uninformed Agent (the UA) cannot tell the difference.
The goal of the present research is thus to -
-develop mechanisms that incentivize an informed agent to calculate and deliver true information, even when this calculation or delivery is costly, and even
when the information is unverifiable by the uninformed agent. The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we formally introduce the information-provision setting. Then, we introduce mechanisms for truthful information elicitation for three types of settings, differing in the level of effort required for providing the information by the IA. In the first setting (Section 3), the IA incurs no cost for producing or delivering the information, hence it is used as a baseline. Here, our mechanism elicits the exact value of each opportunity. The expected expense of the UA is positive but arbitrarily small.
In the second setting (Section 4), the IA incurs a cost for delivering the information to the UA. With some adaptations, our mechanism for the baseline case can still elicit the exact value of each opportunity. The expected expense of the UA in this case is quite favorable, as it only adds an arbitrarily small positive amount to the delivery cost. The latter is unavoidable in any mechanism, as the IA is self-interested and unless covers her information delivery cost will not be willing to provide the information. For the second setting we provide two alternative mechanisms that elicit less accurate (yet still truthful) information for a potentially smaller cost. These, as we show, are useful when the number of opportunities is large.
In the third setting (Section 5), the IA incurs a cost for producing the information. I.e, the IA initially does not have the information, but can obtain it by a costly effort. Here, the challenge is to convince the IA to both produce and provide the correct information, rather than an arbitrary value.
To handle this setting we have to make the realistic assumption that the cost of producing the information is sufficiently small relative to the expected value of the opportunity. Under this assumption, our mechanism is truthful and adds only an arbitrarily small amount to the unavoidable expense, which is the cost of producing the information. We compare our work to existing works in Section 6 and discuss some possible extensions in Section 8.
The Model
The model considers the problem of an Uninformed Agent (the UA) who has a set of opportunities or objects O = {o 1 , ..., o n }. The UA can do business with an Informed Agent (the IA) who holds or can compute some information about the objects in O.
By having the information related to an opportunity o i ∈ O available to an agent, the agent can make the most informed decisions related to o i , e.g., whether it should be exploited or not, resulting in some profit (or loss). Therefore we can map each possible information to be received from the IA, assuming truthful, to the corresponding worth of the opportunity to the agent if both the opportunity and the information are available to the agent. The model assumes that the IA can transfer the information related to any opportunity o i ∈ O (and consequently its corresponding worth) to the UA. For exposition purposes and w.l.o.g. we assume that the information wanted by the UA regarding an opportunity o i is fully encoded in the value of that opportunity, denoted by v i .
Each v i is a random variable with probability distribution
, with v min < v max such that v max > 0 and v min is either positive or negative. The distributions are common knowledge. There is no dependency between values of different opportunities. The cumulative distribution function corresponding to
In the present paper we assume that the UA cares about the exact value of o i only if this value is positive. In other words, the UA needs the exact value only in case the opportunity is exploited (e.g. for reporting to potential investors and financing the exploitation process); if the value is negative the opportunity is not exploited so its exact negative value is unimportant. Formally, denote v + := max(v, 0). Then, for the UA, knowing the value v + i is considered "exact", or "truthful". Thus the goal of our mechanisms is to induce the IA to reveal v + i . Some of our mechanisms can be adapted to reveal the exact v i even when it is negative.
In Cases A and B, we assume there is a cost c i associated with the delivery or production of information about o i . We assume that this cost is common knowledge. This assumption is realistic in many cases. For example, when the object is a car, the work required to appraise it (or to deliver its appraisal) consists of doing several standard checks that consume a known amount of time, so their cost can be reasonably estimated. In Section 7 we discuss the case of unknown costs.
The design space available to the UA for eliciting information from the IA includes offering and/or requesting a payment to/from the IA as well as awarding the IA a subset of O such that the latter can benefit from them. The UA has the power to commit to ex-post payments. However, the UA cannot make any decision based on whether the information delivered by the IA is true or false, since by assumption this information is unverifiable.
The agents have quasi-linear preferences, so that the utility of the IA from getting a certain opportunity for a certain price is the opportunity's value (or zero if the value is negative) minus the price paid. The goal of the UA is to elicit truthful information from the IA while minimizing her own expected expenses, defined as the net payments made and the value of the opportunities transferred to the IA. The goal of the IA is to maximize her net expected profit, taking into account any costs incurred, payments received and the value of opportunities awarded.
In the following sections we provide several alternative mechanisms that the UA can use to receive information from the IA. Unlike the direct-payment mechanism commonly used in practice, our mechanisms guarantee the IA's truthfulness, meaning that a rational IA will choose to incur all costs related to extracting the correct information and report it truthfully. We are interested in mechanisms that allow voluntary participation; therefore, the expense for the UA of receiving the information, in any mechanism, is at least the cost of producing and delivering the information by the IA, as the latter is fully rational and will agree to participate only if her expected net gain is positive. Therefore one important measure for the effectiveness of the mechanism is the guarantee it provides for the additional expense incurred by the UA, other the unavoidable costs of producing or delivering the information.
Case 0: No costs
We begin with a baseline case where the IA incurs no cost in producing and delivering the information. Without any incentives, the IA is indifferent between reporting and not reporting the true value. We show that the UA can make the IA strictly prefer to report the true value, and for an arbitrarily small expense. Interestingly, and in contrast to the cases analyzed in the following sections, the mechanism of this section does not depend on the distributions (f i (x) for o i ∈ O).
We first present the mechanism for the case v min ≥ 0, i.e, all values are positive. The mechanism is parametrized by a probability-value p ∈ [0, 1]. It is done separately for every object o i ∈ O:
1. The UA secretly chooses a reservation value r distributed uniformly at random in
3. The UA reveals r and then:
• If b ≥ r then, with probability p opportunity o i is transferred to the IA in exchange for a payment r, and with probability 1 − p nothing happens. • If b < r then nothing happens.
From the IA's perspective the strategic situation is equivalent to participating in a second price sealed bids auction-the value r can be seen as the best bid among those placed by all other bidders, and if the IA wins she gains an opportunity of value v i while paying r. Since bidding in second price auctions is known to be truthful Vickrey [1961] , this holds in our case too, so it is a dominant strategy for the IA to bid v i . The expected gain of the IA is:
Since the game is zero-sum, this value is also the expected expense of the UA. By controlling the parameter p, the UA can make the IA's expected gain large (to encourage participation) or arbitrarily small (to reduce the UA's expense).
If a probabilistic sale is not practical or not desirable, the parameter p can be implemented in other ways. If the object o i is divisible (e.g, a land-plot with an oil-drilling lease), it is possible to sell a fraction p of o i , for a price of r per unit. If o i is indivisible (e.g, a car), it may be possible to sell the rights to use it for a fraction p of the time. As long as we give the IA a fraction p of the object for price r per unit, the strategic analysis is the same.
We note that our mechanism does not require accurate knowledge of v min , v max -they can be very rough upper/lower bounds. To illustrate, if the objects are jewels, we can even take v min = 0 and v max = $1000000000 and the mechanism will still work as described Now, suppose v min < 0, i.e, negative values are possible. In this case, the effective value for the IA of o i is v
, since she can opt not to use an opportunity if its value is negative. Therefore, the "truthful" behavior of the IA in the above mechanism would be to bid v + i rather than v i . In some cases this is good enough for the UA. If, however, the UA needs the exact value v i even when it is negative, then the above mechanism should be modified by drawing r uniformly at random from [0, v max + |v min |] and adding the following step:
4. If the IA wins the opportunity o i in step 3 and exploits it, then the UA pays her |v min |.
With this modification, the effective exploitation value for the IA is v i + |v min |, which is always weakly-positive, and this will be her bid b. The UA can easily deduce the true value as v i = b − |v min |. Since p → 0, the additional expense for the UA is arbitrarily small.
Case A: Costly information delivery
In this section we assume that the IA already knows the true values of the opportunities, but disclosing these values to the UA incurs some cost. Some example settings are: (a) each appraisal should be signed by a notary who charges a fee per minute; (b) each appraisal needs to go through the IA's datasecurity experts to make sure there are no confidential details disclosed along with the values; (c) the IA initially could sell the information to a third party, but once the information is delivered to the UA, it becomes public and cannot be re-sold.
We denote by c(O ′ ) the cost the IA incurs if delivering the value of all opportunities in O ′ ⊆ O to the UA. Here we assume that the cost is publicly known (we relax this assumption in Section 7). We further assume that this cost is incurred regardless of the nature of the information delivered, i.e., whether providing true or false information.
Eliciting exact values
The mechanism of Section 3 can be augmented to elicit truthful reporting in our case. First, the UA pays the IA an amount
O is the set of opportunities for which the exact value is wanted. This puts the agents back in the situation of Case 0. Then, the mechanism of Section 3 can be used as-is to elicit the exact value of each opportunity in O ′ . As explained in Section 3, the additional positive expense of the UA, (above the unavoidable delivery cost c(O ′ )) can be made arbitrarily small.
However, in contrast to Case 0, now it is not clear that eliciting the exact values of all opportunities is indeed the optimal action. We present below two alternative mechanisms that may be cheaper and, in some cases, more efficient for the UA.
Eliciting all opportunities with value above a threshold
Suppose the UA wants to know the subset O ′ ⊆ O of opportunities whose values are greater than some threshold τ > 0. A natural special case of such query is τ → 0, i.e., when the UA is interested in identifying those opportunities that are worth exploiting. Then the following mechanism can be used. Again the mechanism is parametrized by a probability p ∈ (0, 1).
1. The IA specifies a subset O ′ ⊆ O of objects and their corresponding values.
2. The UA pays to the IA the cost of delivering the values of objects in the provided subset, i.e, c(O ′ ).
3. With probability p, the UA transfers all objects in O ′ to the IA in exchange for a payment τ · |O ′ |. 1 With probability 1 − p nothing happens.
The above mechanism is truthful as the IA has a positive profit from including in O ′ any opportunity with value v > τ (resulting in an expected marginal profit of (v − τ )p). Similarly, the IA is incentivized to exclude from O ′ any opportunity of value v ≤ τ as the expected marginal profit of including it is negative. By setting p → 0, the expected expense for eliciting all opportunities of value above τ (in addition to the unavoidable delivery cost) becomes arbitrarily small.
Eliciting k highest-valued opportunities
At times, the UA may be constrained by the number of opportunities she can exploit out of the set O, for example when opportunities represent picks at the NBA draft. In this case the UA is interested in eliciting the subset
We first present the mechanism for the case v min ≥ 0, i.e, all values are positive. The mechanism is parametrized by a probability-value p ∈ [0, 1]. 3. With probability p, a single random object is picked from the set O ′ and transferred to the IA for free. With probability 1 − p nothing happens.
The mechanism is truthful, as given any subset picked by the IA, replacing an opportunity of value v i with an opportunity of value v j > v i increases the expected profit of the IA by
Similarly, replacing an opportunity with a lower-value opportunity decreases the expected profit of the IA. Again we let p → 0 so that the expected expense for eliciting the k best objects (in addition to the unavoidable delivery cost) becomes arbitrarily small. Now, suppose that v min < 0, i.e, negative values are possible. In this case, it is possible that some of the k best values are negative, and since exploitation is by will, there is no incentive for the IA to prefer providing one negative value over the other. We solve this in a similar way to Section 3, by having the UA pay the IA an amount |v min | whenever in step (3) an opportunity is transferred to the IA (i.e., with probability p), conditioned that the IA exploits that opportunity. This makes exploitation always profitable, hence the IA still prefers to include in O ′ a higher-valued opportunity over a lower-valued one, even if both are negative. Since p → 0, the additional expense of the UA is negligible.
Choice of method
The choice of which method to use among the three presented in this section depends on the a priori distributions of values and costs of delivering the information. In this subsection we numerically illustrate a situation in which the two less accurate mechanisms (i.e, the above-threshold and the best-k) substantially improve the net gain of the UA relative to the exactvalues mechanism. Attempting to make the most out of the example, we design the setting such that:
• Opportunities are a priori homogeneous, i.e., f i (v) = f (v) ∀o i ∈ O -i.e., the improvement is not due to the heterogeneity of the available opportunities.
• The cost function is c(O
e., the improvement is not due to the heterogeneity of the delivery costs of the available opportunities.
• In the two less-accurate mechanisms, the IA provides only the subset of objects that satisfy the relevant criterion (i.e, the above-threshold objects or the k-best objects), and does not report their values. Even with this apparent handicap, the two less-accurate mechanisms still yield a higher net gain for the UA.
In this homogeneous case, if the UA does not receive any information from the IA, then her expected profit from the opportunities available to her is R
is the a priori expected value of any opportunity, i.e., opportunities are exploited only if having a positive expected value. The benefit in using any of the three methods should be calculated by comparing the expected profit obtained from exploiting opportunities with any of the mechanisms (taking into consideration also the expected expenses) and the expected profit without the mechanism (i.e., R N I UA ). Since the goal is to compare the three mechanisms and the value of R N I UA is fixed, we only need to compare the expected revenue in case of obtaining the information in each of the methods.
We start with the mechanism for extracting the exact values. Here, the UA's expected profit from requesting the true value of opportunities in a subset
The described calculation simply considers the benefit from any opportunity in O ′ whenever exploited (i.e., when realizing the value is positive) and the benefit from the other opportunities based on their expected value (second term), minus the associated cost.
Next, we study the mechanism where the IA is requested to specify (without providing the values of) all opportunities in O of value greater than τ > 0. Here, the UA's expected profit when setting a threshold τ , is:
The calculation iterates over all possible output sizes, where the probability of each is
n−i , and takes the appropriate expected exploitation value based on the information that only those returned by the IA are of values greater than τ .
Finally, for the mechanism requesting the k highest-valued opportunities (again, without disclosing the actual values), we use the function F w (v), which captures the probability that the wth highest value in O is lower than or equal to v and is calculated by:
The calculation iterates over all cases where less than w opportunities in O are associated with a value greater than v. Taking the first derivative of F w (v) obtains the probability distribution function for the value of the wth best value, denoted
dx . The expected profit of the UA from the wth best opportunity is E w = ∞ v=−∞ vf w (v)dv. The expected cost the UA incurs, given that the IA returns k opportunities (neglecting all other costs as these are multiplied by p → 0) is c · k. Consequently, the UA's expected net profit when requesting the highest-valued k opportuni-
The first element in the equation corresponds to the expected profit from the k opportunities returned as the best in O. Since there is no way of distinguishing between these opportunities (i.e., we do not know which is associated with the highest value, second highest value etc.) the expected exploitation value of each is the average of the expected exploitation values. Meaning that the same decision whether or not to exploit the opportunity will be used for all. Similar analysis applies for the remaining opportunities as captured by the second term.
We now proceed to the numeric example. Example 1. There are 3 objects (i.e., |O| = 3). The probability distribution f (v) is uniform in [−1, 1]. The information delivery cost is c = 0.1517 per object.
For the exact-values mechanism, the optimal |O ′ | in this example is 3 and the expected profit of the UA in this case is R 1 UA (O ′ ) = 0.295. For the above-threshold mechanism the maximum expected gain is attained for τ = 0.16 and it is R 2 UA (τ ) = 0.5398. For the best-k mechanism, the maximal net gain (R 3 UA (k) = 0.3483) is attained for k=1. So, with both latter mechanisms a substantial improvement is obtained in the UA's expected profit. This, despite the fact that our calculation assumed that these mechanisms only indicate a subset of the opportunities and do not provide the exact values of the opportunities in this set. This means that the actual improvement that can be obtained may be significantly larger.
Intuitively, the improvement achieved can be explained by the fact that the two non-exact methods provide less accurate information but for a cheaper price as information on a smaller number of opportunities needs to be delivered. In many cases, such information is sufficient for the UA's decision making, and the marginal benefit from knowing all the exact values is lower than the additional expense.
Case B: Costly information production
In this section we assume that the IA does not initially have the information, but rather can calculate it by incurring some cost.
Achieving truthfulness in this case is more challenging than in Section 4. Here, the UA cannot just pay the informationproduction cost to the IA, as the UA has no way of knowing whether the IA actually incurred this cost (unlike in Section 4 where the delivery of the information by itself clearly indicates the cost incurred). The IA may find it beneficial to provide some arbitrary (e.g., random) information, saving herself the cost of producing the information. For this case there is no point in requesting information in the form of the k-best opportunities or all those above some threshold, as this requires the IA to calculate the value of all opportunities. While this was also true in the former cases, the calculation there was costless. In the present case, if the IA incurs the cost of calculating the value for the entire set O, the UA might as well ask for the full set of exact values.
Below we present a mechanism for eliciting the value of any single opportunity o i ∈ O for which the cost the IA incurs in calculating its value is c i . We assume that the cost c i is publicly known (we relax this assumption in Section 7). We also assume that the information delivery cost is zero (we relax this assumption in Subsection 5.4).
The mechanism
The mechanism is a variant of the mechanism of Section 3; it differs in the selection of the reservation value. It is parametrized by a probability p ∈ [0, 1] and a positive parameter ǫ. We will later let ǫ approach 0.
1. The UA secretly selects a number r as follows.
• With probability 1 − ǫ, r = E [v] , where E[v] is the expectation of the value of o i .
• With probability ǫ, r is drawn uniformly at random
2. The IA bids a value b.
• If b ≥ r, then, with probability p the UA sells o i to the IA for a payment of r. With probability 1 − p no transfers nor payments are made.
• If b < r, no transfers nor payments are made.
Strategic analysis
Suppose first that the IA does not calculate the true value v. Let g(r) be the distribution used to select r in step 1. Then, the IA's expected revenue by bidding b is:
The integrand is positive iff E[v] > r. Therefore, the optimal strategy for the IA is to bid b = E [v] . However, when ǫ → 0, the reservation value r is almost certainly E [v] , so the expected net gain of the IA is essentially 0.
Suppose now that the IA calculates the true v. In this case, her effective value is v + := max(v, 0), and we already know from Section 3 that her best strategy is to bid v + . The IA's gain in this case, when r = E [v] , is:
0 otherwise From this, we have to subtract the cost c i . Hence the expected net gain of the IA when calculating and revealing the true value is:
To induce the IA to calculate the true v + , it is sufficient to ensure that this gain is above the net gain from bidding b = E[v], which is 0. If we take
for some δ > 0, then the expected net gain of the IA is c i + δ so it is optimal for the IA to calculate and report the true value. The expense incurred by the UA is c i + δ, which can be made arbitrarily close to c i -the unavoidable cost of calculating the true value.
Necessary condition
The above mechanism is feasible only if p, as calculated by (2), is a legal probability value, i.e, p ≤ 1. This implies the following condition on the problem parameters:
The intuition behind condition (3) is that the informationproduction cost should be sufficiently small: if this cost is larger than the gain the IA expects to make from the auction, then it is not profitable for her to incur this cost and participate in the auction. To understand this condition we present several examples.
1. Suppose the value is distributed uniformly in [0,
max /4. Therefore condition (3) becomes: c i < v max /8, i.e., the cost of calculating the information should be less than 1/8 of the maximum possible value. This is quite realistic: the cost of calculating an object's value should be at least one order of magnitude lower than the maximum value of that object. Under this condition, the UA can elicit the true information by executing the mechanism with a probability of p = (c i +δ)/(v max /8) where δ → 0. The expected expense of the UA is c i + δ.
The condition is stricter than in the positive case since, intuitively, when the object's value might be negative, it is more difficult to use it as an incentive.
3. Suppose the value has only two options, i.e., v is a discrete random variable that equals v min with probability q and v max with probability 1 − q. Then:
• When v min < 0 condition (3) is c i < q(1 − q)v max .
Extensions
Several identical objects. Suppose the UA has, instead of a single object with value v i , a certain number m of objects with the same value v i . Then we can let the probability p be in the range [0, m] instead of [0, 1]. The meaning of p larger than 1 is that the IA obtains ⌊p⌋ units with certainty, and one additional unit with probability p − ⌊p⌋. The IA still obtains p units in expectation and still pays r per unit, so the analysis is the same, and in the condition for truthfulness (3) we have have c i /m instead of c i . The more units we have, the weaker is the constraint under which truthfulness can be obtained.
Both production cost and delivery cost Suppose the IA incurs both delivery cost and production cost. We can use the mechanism of Subsection 5.1, and then pay the delivery cost to the IA (if the IA indeed submitted a bid). Note that the IA incurs the delivery cost whenever she delivers any information -whether it is true or false. Therefore, once we pay her the delivery cost, the situation for her is equivalent to the situation in Subsection 5.1.
Related Work
Mechanisms by which an uninformed agent tries to elicit information from an informed agent are as old as King Solomon's judgment (I Kings:3). About two centuries ago, the German writer Goethe invented a mechanism for eliciting the value of his new book from his publisher [Moldovanu and Tietzel, 1998 ]. Interestingly, his mechanism is like our Case 0 mechanism without the probability p.
In the economic literature, a typical setting is that the IA is a seller holding an item and the UA is a buyer wanting that item. This is contrary to our setting, where the one holding the item is the UA. In some settings, the IA is a manager of a firm and the UA is a potential investor. Common to all cases is that the IA holds information that may affect the utility of the UA, and the question is if and how the IA can be induced to disclose this information.
The performance of mechanisms for eliciting information in such settings greatly depend on the verifiability of the information. If the information is ex-post verifiable (i.e, the IA can hide information but cannot present false information), then market forces may be sufficient to push the IA to voluntarily disclose her information Grossman and Hart [1980] ; Grossman [1981] . Mechanisms for information elicitation have been developed for settings where the information is verifiable Hart et al. [2016] , partially verifiable Green and Laffont [1986] ; Glazer and Rubinstein [2004] or verifiable at a cost Ben-Porath et al. [2014] ; Moscarini and Smith [2001] ; Wiegmann et al. [2010] ; Akerlof [1970a] ; Emek et al. [2014] . Works that did consider the case where the information is not verifiable Babaioff et al. [2012] assumed that if purchased, the information provided is always correct.
When information is not verifiable and is not guaranteed to be correct (as in our setting) there is often an incentive for the IA to provide false information. This was first demonstrated by Akerlof [1970b] .
The Bayesian truth serum [Prelec, 2004; Barrage and Lee, 2010; Weaver and Prelec, 2013] and its variants [Offerman et al., 2009; Witkowski and Parkes, 2012; Radanovic and Faltings, 2013] are mechanisms for eliciting information related to subjective opinion, which is inherently unverifiable. The ESP game is a mechanism for inducing agents to solve a problem. Although the solution is verifiable, it is being solved semi-automatically using crowdsourcing, so we consider it as non-verifiable. Waggoner and Chen [2013] define and analyze the output agreement class of mechanisms, in which players are rewarded based on the metric distance between their reports. Both methods rely on having many IAs with similar opinions. When there are many IAs, our problem becomes easier. For example, with three IAs the following mechanism is possible for Case B: (a) Offer each IA to sell you the information for c + ǫ. (b) Collect the reports of all agreeing agents. (c) If one report is not identical to at least one other report, then file a complaint against this IA and send her to jail. This creates a coordination game where the focal point is to reveal the true value, similarly to the ESP game. In our setting there is a single IA, so this trick is not possible. This makes our setting more challenging.
Our work is motivated by government auctions for oil and gas fields. A lease for mining oil/gas is put to a first-price sealed-bid auction. the IA is an oil firm who holds a lease to a nearby location and provides her information about the potential value of the auctioned location. the UA here is an oil firm who does not have this information. Hendricks et al. [1994] discuss the equilibrium outcome of this game. They show that the IA underbids and gains information rent, and the UA plays a mixed strategy that gives her zero expected value. Porter [1995] provides empirical evidence supporting this conclusion from almost 40 years of auctions by the US government. It indicates that information asymmetry causes the government to lose about 30% of the potential revenue. As a solution, Hendricks et al. [1993] suggest to exclude the IA from the auction and induce her to reveal her information by promising her a fixed percentage of the auction revenues. However, practical considerations suggest that it may not be possible to exclude the neighbor firm. They suggest a variant of first-price sealed-bid auction that should, in theory, generate a high revenue to the government.
The mechanisms we propose make use of the reservationprice concept, which can be found in literature on auctions where agents have to incur a cost for learning their own value. For example, Hausch and Li [1993] discuss an auction for a single item with a common value. Each bidder incurs a cost for participating in the auction, and additional cost for estimating the value of the item. The second cost depends on the accuracy of the estimation: the agent can select α and learn the true value of the item with probability α. With sufficient potential bidders, bidders expect a profit equal to their entrance fees plus information costs. Thus, overall, bidders make zero expected profit. The expected selling price is the expected value of the object less expected aggregate information and entry costs, so the seller indirectly pays these costs. Persico [2000] discuss an extended model where the bidders can pay to make their estimate of the value more informative. They prove that the payoff in a first price auction is more risksensitive than in a second price; therefore, prior to a first-price auction, bidders will acquire more information compared to prior to a second-price auction.
Finally, our work is somewhat related to works on scoring rules [Hossain and Okui, 2013] , where the goal is to elicit an agent's belief about a random variable.
Unknown Cost of Information
So far, we assumed that the UA knows the costs incurred by the IA. While this assumption is realistic in many cases (e.g, the cost of appraising a car or a house is quite standard), in some cases the cost might be known only to the IA. Naturally the IA might try to convince the UA that the costs are high, since this will increase her revenue, while the UA might dispute the high cost estimates in order to decrease her expense. To gain insight on this situation, we compare it to bilateral trading. In standard bilateral trading, a single consumer wants to buy a physical product from a single producer; in our setting, the UA is the consumer, the IA is the producer, and the "product" is information. This is like bilateral trading, with the additional difficulty that the consumer cannot verify the "product" received.
In bilateral trading, the case when the production cost c is common knowledge is easy: the consumer can make a takeit-or-leave-it offer to buy the product for c + δ, where δ → 0. A rational producer will accept the offer, so the consumer will get the product for a minimal expense. The situation becomes more complicated when the cost is not objectively known. Baron and Myerson [1982] studied this setting assuming the UA has a value U (known to the UA) for having the product, and a prior on the cost given by pdf h and cdf H, with support [c min , c max ]. Define the virtual cost function of the producer by:
(it is analogous to the virtual valuation function used in Myerson's optimal auction theory). By Myerson's theorem, the expected expense of the consumer in any truthful mechanism equals the expected virtual cost of the producer in that mechanism, E c [z(c)]. Therefore, to maximize the expected utility, the consumer should buy the product if-and-only-if z(c) < U . Under standard regularity assumptions on h, the virtual cost function z(c) is increasing with c. In that case, the consumer's utility is maximized by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to buy the product for a price of:
since the producer sells the product iff c < R, which occurs iff z(c) < U . Example 2. Suppose the cost is distributed uniformly in [0, c max ]. Then the virtual cost function is z(c) = 2c, and z −1 (U ) = U/2. The price offered by a consumer with value U is R(z, U ) = min(c max , U/2). If U/2 > c max then the consumer offers c max and the producer always sells. If U/2 < c max then the consumer offers U/2 and the producer sells only if the cost happens to be less than U/2.
We now return to our setting, in which the "product" is the information about an object. For each object o i , we distinguish between two values: the value for both agents of the object itself, which we denoted by v i , and the value for the UA of knowing v i , which we denote here by U i . This U i can be calculated using the prior on v i and the intended use of the information, as illustrated in Section 4. Here we just take U i as given. We assume that the object's value v i and the IA's cost c i are independent random variables.
In Case A, the mechanism of Baron and Myerson [1982] can be used as-is for eliciting the exact values. Suppose the IA can calculate the value of o i by incurring a cost c i . Suppose the UA does not know c i , but knows its prior distribution functions h i , H i and thus knows its virtual-cost function z i . Then, the UA should offer to pay the IA a fee of R(z i , U i ) for participating in the mechanism, where R is given by (4). If c i < R, then the IA accepts the offer, the agents proceed to the mechanism of Case 0, and the UA obtains the information for an expense of R. Otherwise, the IA rejects the offer and the UA does not obtain the information.
In Case B the situation is similar: the UA has to ensure that the IA sells the information iff z i (c i ) < U i , which happens iff c i < R(z i , U i ). This can be done by executing the mechanism of Section 5 with probability:
which is possible iff p ≤ 1, i.e, R(
Example 3. Suppose the information production cost is distributed uniformly in [0, c max ], the object's value is distributed uniformly in [0, v max ], and the UA's value from obtaining the information is U . As calculated in the previous example, R = min(c max , U/2). Therefore the UA should offer the IA to participate in the mechanism of Section 5 with probability: p = min(c max , U/2) v max /8 which is possible iff min(c max , U/2) ≤ v max /8. The net expected gain of the IA is min(c max , U/2) − c i . Therefore, the IA accepts the offer iff min(c max , U/2) > c i . In this case, the UA obtains the information for an expense of min(c max , U/2), which is the same expense of buying a physical product.
To sum: the mechanisms presented in this paper allow us to do bilateral trade in information, just as we would do bilateral trade in physical goods.
Discussion and Future Work
Information now plays an ever-increasing role in almost every aspect of our daily lives. Consequently, information providers are now ubiquitous, enabling people and agents to acquire complete and timely information of various sorts and types to support decision making of all forms. Being self-interested agents, information providers typically seek to maximize their revenue and this is where the failure of direct payment becomes apparent, especially when the information provided is non-verifiable.
The importance of the mechanisms provided and analyzed in the paper is therefore in their guarantee for truthfulness in the information elicitation process. Furthermore, with all mechanisms truthfulness is attained while incurring an arbitrarily small expense beyond whatever unavoidable costs the setting dictates. The following paragraphs indicate some future work directions.
Unknown prior on value We assumed that there is a common prior on the value of each object. Without a prior, the mechanism of Case 0 still works. The mechanisms of Case A still work too, but without a prior, the UA will not be able to choose which of the three mechanisms is better. The mechanism of Case B does not work, since without a prior the UA cannot calculate the probability p. It is interesting whether this case can be solved by a prior-free mechanism.
Risk-averse agents We assumed that the agents are riskneutral, so that their utility for a random mechanism is the expectation of the value. It is interesting to check what happens in the common case in which the agents are risk-averse.
Differing values
We assumed that the IA and the UA have the same value for the object. In practice, the values might be different. For example, the value of an oil field to a geologist is potentially less than its value to the oil company. Our mechanisms can still be used if the values are sufficiently highly correlated. For example, if the value for the IA is always 0.1 of the value for the UA, then we just have to run our mechanisms and multiply the result by 10. It is interesting whether any mechanism can work when the values are uncorrelated.
Better guarantees for Case B Our mechanism for Case B (costly information production) works only when condition (3) is satisfied, i.e, the cost of information production is sufficiently small. It is interesting whether there exists a different mechanism that works under a weaker condition, i.e, when the cost is higher.
